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Abstract 
There are obvious similarities between the cognitive constructs of Beck’s cognitive 
theory, the hopelessness model, and the response styles theory. No single comprehensive model 
has yet integrated the core cognitive concepts of these theories, however. In order to develop 
such an integrative cognitive model, we conducted two independent studies with 588 and 606 
participants, respectively, from a university population. Both studies support the idea that all 
cognitive constructs of the three models are distinct from each other. Furthermore, both studies 
provide evidence for the possibility an integration of the constructs in one cognitive model. If 
future studies replicate these findings, the integrated cognitive model can provide a theoretical 
framework to better understand how therapeutic techniques derived from one model influence 
cognitive variables from another model. This might even allow for improvements in the 
effectiveness of psychotherapies by theory-driven combinations of therapeutic techniques that 
are based on different models. 
 
 
Keywords: depression; cognitive theory; hopelessness model; response styles theory; 
vulnerability factors. 
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Over the past several decades, three major cognitive theories to explain the development 
and maintenance of depression have been developed, empirically tested, and gained widespread 
popularity: Beck’s cognitive theory (Beck, 1976), the hopelessness model (Abramson, Alloy, & 
Metalsky, 1989), and the response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girus, & Seligman, 1992). 
These models are of particular importance for different reasons: First, they help us to explain 
epidemiological data (e.g., sex difference in depression rates; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1992). 
Second, they provide a theoretical basis for mechanisms underlying the development and 
maintenance of depression. Finally, some of the most effective interventions for depression have 
been developed based on these models (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976, Ramel, Gordon, 
Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004). 
Similarities between these models are obvious and have been pointed out by the authors 
of the models themselves (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). One of the most apparent similarities 
between the three cognitive models is their classification as cognitive vulnerability-stress 
models. This implies that the interactions between cognitive vulnerabilities and activating 
negative events are used to explain why some individuals develop depression whereas others do 
not show this psychopathology. Beyond this relatively crude classification, other obvious 
theoretical similarities exist between the cognitive constructs of these theories that will be 
described in detail below after a short introduction to the different cognitive models (see 
Distinguishability of the constructs in the three cognitive models). These similarities raise the 
question whether cognitive constructs of all three models can be integrated into one cognitive 
approach. Consistent with that it is unlikely that the three cognitive theories are presenting 
entirely distinct etiological pathways, leading to the development of depression. Thus, “the 
richest examination of the cognitive theories will involve the integration of the various cognitive 
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constructs into one integrated model” (Abela & Scheffler, 2008, pg. 335). The development of an 
integrated cognitive model is not only important from an academic point of view, but also for 
clinical applications, as many intervention studies already attempt to use techniques from one 
cognitive model to change cognitive constructs proposed by another cognitive models without a 
theoretical justification. A recent example is an intervention that teaches techniques based 
“largely on Beck’s and colleagues’ cognitive therapy for depression”, but predicts that these 
interventions would lead to a more optimistic inference style (hopelessness model) and that the 
inference style would causally mediate the effects of this intervention on depressive symptoms 
(Seligman, Schulman, & Tryon, 2007, pg. 1115). The development of an integrative cognitive 
model would allow us to go beyond using techniques and concepts based on different individual 
cognitive models or a collection of isolated features of such individual models. Moreover, such a 
model would allow us to better understand how different techniques influence cognitive 
variables and how concepts from various cognitive models interact. Beyond these theoretical 
advancements, an integrative model might lead to improvement in the effectiveness of 
psychotherapies for depression by allowing a theory-driven optimized combination of 
therapeutic techniques that are based on different models. 
In order to develop such an integrative model, we used a two-tier approach: the first step 
was to investigate empirically if the cognitive constructs of the different models are distinct from 
each other. After this, we tested whether and how the cognitive constructs of all different models 
can be integrated into one comprising model. 
The cognitive models can be interpreted as sequential pathway models, which organize 
the cognitive constructs of each model based on their sequential relationships to the onset of 
depressive symptoms (Alloy, Clements, & Kolden, 1985). Whereas distal constructs can be 
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defined as relatively early factors in the trajectory leading to the development of depressive 
symptoms, proximal constructs are placed later in this sequence. In addition, the sequential 
pathway model implies that each cognitive construct causally mediates the relationship between 
its preceding and subsequent construct completely (Alloy et al., 1985). 
Beck’s Cognitive Model 
In Beck’s cognitive model (1976), schemata, cognitive errors, cognitive triad, and 
automatic thoughts are central to the development and maintenance of depression. Schemata are 
relatively enduring, organizing structures that guide situational information processing. 
Depressogenic schemata are negative in content and consist of immature, absolute, and rigid 
attitudes about the self and its relation to the world. When activated by stress, depressogenic 
schemata lead to cognitive errors, the next step in the causal pathway to depression. Cognitive 
errors cause our perception and thinking to be unrealistic, extreme, and distorted in a negative 
way. As a result, cognitions are dominated by a negative view of the self, the world, and the 
future—the so-called cognitive triad. Following Beck (1976), the cognitive triad finds its 
expression in negative automatic thoughts. Automatic thoughts are understood as temporary, 
non-emotional mental events, which are subjectively plausible in a certain situation (Beck, 
1976). These automatic thoughts can be interpreted as the most proximal cause for the emotional, 
somatic, and motivational symptoms of depression. It needs to be mentioned that empirical 
studies found the constructs in Beck’s theory to only partially mediate the relationship between 
their preceding and subsequent constructs (Kwon & Oei, 1992; Pössel, 2010a; Stewart et al., 
2004).  In other words, contrary to the sequential interpretation of Beck’s theory, each construct 
in his cognitive theory is directly associated with each other. 
Hopelessness Model 
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The hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) features inference style as the distal and 
hopelessness as the proximal cause of depression. Inference style is described as the tendency to 
make negative inferences about (1) the stability and (2) globality of causes of negative events, 
(3) the consequences of negative events, and (4) characteristics of the self following negative 
events. When an individual infers a negative event in this way, he or she develops the 
expectation of helplessness, which we can interpret as the proximal cause for the symptoms of 
depression. Moreover, (5) the additional internal attribution of negative events is thought to lead 
to low self-esteem. 
Response Style Theory 
The response styles theory proposes that the way an individual responds to a depressed 
mood is the central factor determining the development, severity, and duration of a depressive 
episode (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Individuals who respond to their depressed moods 
by repetitively focusing their attention on their symptoms and their implications demonstrate a 
so-called ruminative response style. This ruminative process is thought to lead to a worsening of 
the depressed mood. A recent factor analytic study revealed that a ruminative response style can 
be separated into depression-related rumination, reflection, and brooding (Treynor, Gonzalez, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Treynor and colleagues demonstrated that depression-related 
rumination can be seen more as a symptom than as a risk factor of depressive symptoms. 
Reflection, the part of rumination that indicates the tendency to contemplate and reflect, as well 
as brooding, a tendency toward melancholic pondering, on the other hand, seem distinguishable 
from depressive symptoms. 
Distinguishability of Constructs in the Three Cognitive Models 
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While the sequential pathway model (Alloy et al., 1985) provides a framework how to 
organize cognitive constructs that are distinguishable, it does not provide any support with the 
question if cognitive construct from different cognitive models are distinguishable from each 
other. Previous studies, however, provide some ideas with regard to this first purpose of our 
studies, the investigation whether the cognitive constructs of the different models are distinct 
from each other (distinguishable concepts vs. integrated concept). Other research provides 
information about the goal of our studies to test whether and how the cognitive constructs of all 
different models can be integrated in one model. 
So far, only one recent publication has investigated the relationship between cognitive 
core variables of all three models (Hankin, Lakdawalla, Latchis Carter, Abela, & Adams, 2007). 
This study examined the correlations between depressogenic schemata, negative inference style 
(inferences to stability, globality, consequences, self), and rumination with two independent 
factor analytic studies. The research confirmed three distinguishable but nevertheless correlated 
cognitive constructs in a college student population. 
Several other factor analytical studies with adult populations investigated the relationship 
between some cognitive constructs of Beck’s cognitive theory and the hopelessness model 
(Joiner & Rudd, 1996; Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992; Reno & Halaris, 1989; Spangler, Simons, 
Monroe, & Thase, 1997). Joiner and Rudd (1996) investigated the relationship between negative 
inferences of causes (internal, stable, global) and depressogenic schemata in two studies with 
independent student samples. In their exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses all three 
variables (dysfunctional attitude, inferences of causes dimension internal/external, and 
depressive symptoms) formed their own factor while the inferences of the causes dimensions 
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stable/unstable and global/specific constitute a combined factor. These results support 
depressogenic schemata and inferences as distinguishable constructs. 
Although the factor analytical studies reported so far support the independence of the 
cognitive constructs, Neimeyer and Feixas (1992) reported some common variance in their 
exploratory factor analysis with depressed outpatients. They found that negative inferences about 
causes (internal, stable, global) and cognitive errors load on the same factor while two 
instruments to measure depressive symptoms load on another factor. Consistent with this result, 
Leung and Wong’s (1998) suggest that negative inferences about causes are a specific form of 
cognitive error (i.e., internal attribution = personalizing). Thus, it can be speculated that 
inference style and cognitive errors might describe the same underlying construct. If this is true, 
an integrated cognitive model treating inferences and cognitive errors as one factor should fit the 
data better than a model that treats both cognitive constructs as distinguishable. However, an 
alternative explanation for Neimeyer and Feixas’ (1992) findings is based on the sequential 
pathway model, which assumes that inference style and cognitive errors are constructs relatively 
distal to depressive symptoms. 
Similarly, the sequential pathway model can provide an explanation for Reno and 
Halaris’ (1989) findings. These authors investigated the relationship between depressogenic 
schemata, negative inferences about causes (internal, stable, global), cognitive errors, and 
automatic thoughts in an exploratory factor analysis with depressed patients. In this study, all 
cognitive constructs but automatic thoughts formed one common factor. In the sequential 
pathway model depressogenic schemata, negative inferences, and cognitive errors are in closer 
proximity to each other than automatic thoughts. Once again, the sequential pathway model 
provides an explanation why these variables loaded on a single factor in Reno and Halaris’ study 
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that only included these four cognitive constructs. This interpretation is supported by studies 
using other methods than factor analyses. For example, inference style more consistently predicts 
depressive symptoms (Alloy et al., 1999; Haeffel et al., 2003) and daily negative cognitions 
(Hankin, Fraley, & Abela, 2005) than schemata. Thus, consistent with the sequential pathway 
model and empirical evidence it can be assumed that inference style, depressogenic schemata, 
and cognitive errors are distinguishable constructs. If the interpretation of Neimeyer and Feixas’ 
(1992) and Reno and Halaris’ (1989) results based on the sequential pathway model is correct, a 
study including constructs that fill the gap in the sequence (e.g., cognitive triad) should reveal the 
distinctiveness of the inference style. 
Finally, an experimental design that manipulated schemata, thoughts, and emotions 
independently found that the manipulation of thoughts or emotions influenced both constructs, 
making them indistinguishable from each other (Pössel & Knopf, 2008). Thus, automatic 
thoughts might be interpreted more as symptoms than as risk factor of depression. In order to test 
for this possibility, empirical research aiming for the development of an integrated cognitive 
model needs to include depressive symptoms. 
Associations of Cognitive Constructs in an Integrated Cognitive Model 
The majority of studies testing if and how the cognitive constructs of the different 
cognitive models can be integrated come from some of the authors of the original theories. 
Metalsky, one of the authors of the hopelessness model, proposes that Abramson et al.’s concept 
of hopelessness (1989) and Beck’s (1976) negative view of the future as part of the cognitive 
triad can be seen as the same construct (Metalksy & Joiner, 1992). This notion is shared by 
Spangler et al. (1997). Contrary to the prediction of the hopelessness model, Metalsky and Joiner 
(1992) found hopelessness to be only partially temporally mediated by the association between 
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inference style and depressive symptoms in a longitudinal study. Therefore, the authors suggest 
that not hopelessness but all three parts of Beck’s cognitive triad are mediators for this 
association. Based on this assumption, hopelessness (negative view of the future) will be 
compared with the cognitive triad as statistical mediator between inference style and depressive 
symptoms in our study. 
Spasojević and Alloy (2001) demonstrated in a study with undergraduate students that 
rumination completely temporally mediates the relationship of depressogenic schemata and 
negative inference style (inferences to stability, globality, consequences, self) with depressive 
symptoms. Smith and Alloy (2009) assume that ruminative response style can be understood as 
repetitive process while negative automatic thoughts as Beck (1976) described them represent 
the content of thinking. Nolen-Hoeksema (1991, 2004) further specifies the relationship between 
rumination and negative automatic thoughts. She emphasizes that a ruminative response style 
focuses the attention of an individual and negative automatic thoughts may arise as result of this 
style of thinking. If this is the case, rumination should effect negative automatic thoughts that 
lead to the increase of depressive symptoms.  
A recent longitudinal study tested the associations between Beck’s constructs (1976) 
measured as one latent variable and the two ruminative response styles brooding and reflection 
(Pössel, 2010b). This study found that that Beck’s constructs influence brooding while the 
elimination of reflection increased the model fit. In addition, a study testing the associations of 
inference style and the two ruminative response styles brooding and reflection revealed that 
brooding partially mediates the relationship between inference style and depressive symptoms 
(Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008). Reflection, however, does not function as statistical mediator because 
it shows only low associations with inference style and depressive symptoms. Thus, we 
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hypothesize that brooding will be influenced by the cognitive triad and inference style but not by 
automatic thoughts. The associations of reflection, on the other hand, might be difficult to 
address due to low or even no associations with depression and other cognitive constructs. 
Furthermore, reflection might not be a part of an integrated cognitive model at all. 
Current Studies 
The first step to develop an integrated cognitive model is to test if the cognitive 
constructs of the different models are distinct from each other. Based on the majority of 
empirical studies, we hypothesize that all discussed cognitive constructs in the three cognitive 
models are distinguishable from each other and from depressive symptoms. Nevertheless, some 
studies support the idea that some constructs are not distinguishable (Neimeyer & Feixas, 1992; 
Pössel & Knopf, 2008; Reno & Halaris, 1989). Thus, models with cognitive errors, inference 
style, and depressogenic schemata as separated constructs versus models treating them as one 
construct are compared. Similar, models treating automatic thoughts and depressive symptoms as 
separated versus one construct are compared. 
The second purpose of our studies is to test whether the cognitive constructs of all 
different models can be integrated in one model. Thus, a model separating the cognitive 
constructs by the three original cognitive models was compared with different models integrating 
the original cognitive models. Based on empirical evidence (Metalksy & Joiner, 1992; Spangler 
et al., 1997) that not only hopelessness (negative view of the future) but all three parts of the 
cognitive triad mediate the relationship between inference style and depressive symptoms, 
models using hopelessness and cognitive triad as statistical mediators are compared. While the 
associations of most cognitive constructs seem defined, the relations of inference style with 
depressogenic schemata and cognitive errors are still unclear. Therefore, the integrating models 
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differ partially with respect to the associations of inference style. It is predicted that the cognitive 
triad will be influenced by inference style. In addition, it is proposed that brooding is effected by 
cognitive triad and inference style and influences automatic thoughts. Due to low correlations of 
reflection with all other cognitive constructs and depressive symptoms, it is predicted that 
reflection will not be a part of the integrated cognitive model at all. As empirical studies suggest 
partial mediation between different constructs of the same and different models (Kwon & Oei, 
1992; Lo et al., 2008; Metalksy & Joiner, 1992; Pössel, 2010a; Stewart et al., 2004), full and 
partial mediation models will be compared. 
STUDY 1 
Method 
Participants and Procedures 
The sample for Study 1 was derived from 588 psychology students (507 females, 81 
males) at a university in southwest Germany.  Their ages ranged from 18 to 52 years with a mean 
of 23.27 years and a standard deviation of 7.11 years. Of the participating students, 115 (19.6%) 
reported clinically significant depressive symptoms in a self-report measure. In groups of 8 to 15, 
participants completed a questionnaire battery including a measure of depression and various 
instruments to investigate cognitive constructs. The order of the questionnaires was 
counterbalanced across the sample following the Latin Square design. Informed consent was 
obtained from all participants; they also received course credits for their participation. 
Measures 
Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale (CES – D): The CES-D (Radloff, 
1977; German version: Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993) consists of 20 items and was developed to be 
a quickly administered, economical screening instrument able to measure depressive symptoms 
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based on self-report. The frequency of symptoms is rated on a four-point scale, with higher 
numbers indicating a higher frequency of occurrence. Following the German norming sample, a 
score of ≥ 23 represents clinically significant depressive symptoms (Hautzinger & Bailer, 1993). 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS): The DAS Form A (Weissman & Beck, 1978; 
German version: Hautzinger, Joormann, & Keller, 2005) consists of 40 7-point Likert items that 
measure depressogenic schemata, a cognitive construct described by Beck (1976). Based on the 
factor analyses conducted by Cane, Olinger, Gotlib, and Kuiper (1986), the DAS scale was 
divided into the subscales performance evaluation and approval by others. This factor structure 
was replicated with the German version of the DAS (Joormann, 2004). In this sample, only the 
items loading on one of the two factors were administered. Higher scores in each subscale 
represent greater endorsement of depressogenic schemata. 
Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CEQ): The CEQ (Lefebvre, 1981; German version: 
Pössel, 2009a) consists of 24 5-point Likert items that measure cognitive errors, a cognitive 
construct described by Beck (1976). The German CEQ includes the subscales catastrophizing, 
overgeneralization, personalization, and selective abstraction as well as a second order factor 
(Pössel, 2009a). Thus, all item values are added up to a total score, with higher scores 
representing greater endorsement of cognitive errors. 
Cognitive Triad Instrument (CTI): The CTI (Beckham, Leber, Watkins, Boyer, & Cook, 
1986; German version: Pössel, 2009b) consists of 36 7-point Likert items to measure the 
cognitive triad [view of the self (10 items), the world (10 items), and the future (10 items)], a 
cognitive construct described by Beck (1976). The remaining six items are filler items that are 
not scored. The items are phrased in both positive and negative direction. While Anderson and 
Skidmore (1995) revealed a 5-factor structure and McIntosh and Fischer (2000) found only one 
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factor for the original CTI, the German evaluation revealed a 6-factor structure comprising not 
only scales to measure view of self, view of world, and view of future, but also separating each 
of these scales into negatively and positively worded items (Pössel, 2009b). The negative scales 
correlated higher with concurrent and predicted depressive symptoms than the positive scales 
(Pössel, 2009b). Before calculating the scores for the CTI by summing, all items are pooled so 
that higher scores represent positive views and lower scores represent negative views.  
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire-Revised (ATQ-R): The ATQ-R (Kendall, Howard, & 
Hays, 1989; German version: Pössel, Seemann, & Hautzinger, 2005) measures automatic 
thoughts as described by Beck (1976). The German ATQ-R includes the subscales negative self-
statements (12 items), well-being (5 items), and self-confidence (4 items) and consists of 21 5-
point items. A higher summary score in the subscale negative self-statements indicates more 
negative automatic thoughts, whereas higher scores in the subscales well-being and self-
confidence indicate more positive automatic thoughts. In this sample, only the negative self-
statements scale was administered. 
Cognitive Style Questionnaire (CSQ): The CSQ (Haeffel et al., 2008; German version: 
Pössel, 2010c) measures inferences about causes, consequences, and self in relation to negative 
events as described by Abramson et al. (1989). The CSQ consists of 24 hypothetical event 
scenarios—12 negative and 12 positive (including 6 interpersonal and 6 achievement scenarios 
each). Only the negative event scenarios were used in this study. 
In the CSQ, respondents are presented with a hypothetical event and asked to write down 
one cause for the event. Respondents then rate the degree to which the cause of the hypothetical 
event was (a) internal, (b) stable, and (c) global (negative inferences for causal attributions). 
Next, they rate the likelihood that further negative consequences will result from the event 
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(negative inferences of consequences). Finally, they rate the degree to which the occurrence of 
the event means that the self is flawed (negative inferences of the self). Each rating uses a 7-
point Likert scale, with higher scores representing a more depressive inference style. 
Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ): The German version of the Rumination Response 
Subscale (RRS) of the RSQ (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; German version: Bürger & 
Kühner, 2007) consists of 18 4-point Likert items that measure how often a participant engages 
in various behaviors in response to a depressed mood. Based on the factor analyses conducted by 
Treynor et al. (2003), the RRS was divided into the subscales depression-related, reflection, and 
brooding. Higher scores in each subscale represent more engagement in certain behaviors. 
Data Analysis 
As in Hankin et al.’s (2007) study, CFA with the maximum likelihood method were 
conducted using AMOS 18.0 to calculate structural equation models (Arbuckle, 1999). Goodness 
of fit of the CFA was tested with ². However, as ² is known to increase with sample size and 
degrees of freedom, the ² is complemented by using ²/df, root mean squared of the residuals 
(RMSEA; Steiger & Lind, 1980), and the comparative fit index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) as well. 
Furthermore, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1974) and ² difference tests are 
calculated to compare the models. 
While a full explanation of these indices and their limitations is beyond the scope of this 
article, a short description seems necessary: Statistically nonsignificant values of ² indicate a 
good fit of the model to the data. A RMSEA value of .00 indicates a perfect model fit; a value of  
 .05 is conventionally regarded as an indicator of a good model fit; and a value of  .08 is seen 
as acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999). CFI values of  .95 indicate a good model fit and values of 
 .90 are regarded as acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Finally, AIC is a measure of parsimony 
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that adjusts model chi-square to penalize for model complexity. AIC reflects the discrepancy 
between model-implied and observed covariance matrices. Comparing two models, the lower 
AIC reflects the model with the better fit to the data (Akaike, 1974) with 0-2 as substantial 
support, 4-7 as weak support, and > 10 essential none support for equivalency of both models 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  In addition, nested models are compared by subtracting the ² 
values as well as the dfs of the models from each other (² difference tests). When Δ² is 
significant for Δdf, the models are seen as significantly different from each other. 
As the goal of Study 1 was to examine the nature of a set of constructs, the CFA’s were 
calculated with item parcels based on existing subscales (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & 
Widaman, 2002). A CFA requires at least two observable variables loading on one latent 
variable. Therefore, when earlier studies did not establish subscales (ATQ, RSQ brooding, RSQ 
reflection) the observed variables were used to estimate the construct of interest in the CFA. 
Results 
Descriptive data, internal consistency, and correlations for all instruments applied in 
Study 1 are presented in Table I. Almost all measures were moderately correlated with each 
other. Only the RSQ scale reflection did not correlate with many other instruments to measure 
cognitive constructs and the CES-D. 
Tests for Distinctiveness of Cognitive Constructs 
To test whether the cognitive constructs of the different models are distinct from each 
other, a measurement model treating all constructs as different was calculated, ² (210, N = 588) 
= 1128.24, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.29, CFI (.881), RMSEA (.075), AIC (1943.29). This model was 
compared with alternative measurement models treating inference style and depressogenic 
schemata, ² (219, N = 588) = 1099.48, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.02, CFI (.848), RMSEA (.083), AIC 
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(1309.48), cognitive errors, ² (219, N = 588) = 1293.58, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.91, CFI (.815), 
RMSEA (.091), AIC (1503.58), and depressogenic schemata and cognitive errors, ² (227, N = 
588) = 1400.75, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.17, CFI (.798), RMSEA (.094), AIC (1594.75), as well as 
automatic thoughts and depressive symptoms as one construct, ² (218, N = 588) = 948.39, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 4.35, CFI (.874), RMSEA (.076), AIC (1160.39). The Δ² difference tests revealed 
that the model treating cognitive constructs of the different models as distinct from each other 
fits the data significantly better than the models treating inference style and depressogenic 
schemata, Δ² (9, N = 588) = 199.24, p < .001, cognitive errors, Δ² (9, N = 588) = 393.34, p < 
.001, and depressogenic schemata and cognitive errors, Δ² (17, N = 588) = 500.51, p < .001, as 
well as automatic thoughts and depressive symptoms as one construct, Δ² (8, N = 588) = 48.15, 
p < .001. 
To improve the measurement model, two additional alternative models were tested based 
on previous literature. First, based on recent empirical studies (Lo et al., 2008; Pössel, 2010b) 
and the low correlations of the response style reflection with the other constructs measured in 
Study 1, the measurement model was compared with a model without reflection, ² (196, N = 
588) = 856.14, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.37, CFI (.883), RMSEA (.076), AIC (1062.14). This 
comparison confirmed that the original measurement model fit the data better than the model 
without reflection, Δ² (14, N = 588) = 44.10, p < .001. 
Second, considering the unstable factor structure of the CTI, highlighted by the fact that 
three different factor structures were found in the only three empirical studies researching the 
factor structure of the CTI (Anderson & Skidmore, 1995; McIntosh & Fischer, 2000; Pössel, 
2009b), the six CTI scales found in the German evaluation study of the CTI were treated as 
distinguishable constructs. This improved not only the goodness-of-fit and parsimony of the 
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measurement model, ² (183, N = 588) = 686.62, p < .001, χ2/df = 3.75, CFI (.913), RMSEA 
(.068), AIC (968.62), but this model fits the data even better than the original measurement 
model, Δ² (27, N = 588) = 213.62, p < .001. Further, based on the lower correlations of the 
positive CTI scales with depressive symptoms and the other constructs measured in Study 1 as 
well as the German evaluation study (Pössel, 2009b), the measurement model with six CTI 
scales was compared with a model without the positive CTI scales, ² (150, N = 588) = 499.34, p 
< .001, χ2/df = 3.33, CFI (.930), RMSEA (.063), AIC (703.34). All indices of goodness of fit and 
parsimony as well as the Δ² difference test revealed that the measurement model without the 
positive CTI scales fit the data better than the model with six CTI scales, Δ² (33, N = 588) = 
187.28, p < .001. 
Tests for Mediations 
The second purpose of our studies is to test whether the cognitive constructs of all 
different models can be integrated in one model. To do this, a repeated sequence of analytical 
steps was followed. Full and partial mediation models for two proposed models were calculated 
and compared first, followed by comparing the better fitting models of each of the two proposed 
models with each other. Then, full and partial mediation models for the next proposed model 
were calculated and compared with the best fitting model of the previous comparisons. Thus, 
each tested model based on the results of the previously tested model and is identical to this 
model in all associations besides the specified relationships. 
Following this strategy, a model separating the cognitive constructs of the three original 
cognitive models without positive CTI scales and allowing only for full mediation, ² (180, N = 
588) = 1512.62, p < .001, χ2/df = 8.40, CFI (.734), RMSEA (.112), AIC (1656.62), was 
compared with a similar model but allowing for partial mediation, ² (169, N = 588) = 961.14, p 
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< .001, χ2/df = 5.69, CFI (.842), RMSEA (.089), AIC (1127.14). The Δ² difference test revealed 
that the partial mediation model fits the data significantly better than the model with full 
mediation, Δ² (11, N = 588) = 551.48, p < .001. 
Following Nolen-Hoeksema (1991, 2004), Smith and Alloy (2009) and Spasojević and 
Alloy (2001), models in which automatic thoughts mediate the association of brooding and 
reflection with depressive symptoms fully, ² (169, N = 588) = 958.64, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.67, 
CFI (.842), RMSEA (.089), AIC (1124.64), and partially, ² (167, N = 588) = 953.38, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 5.71, CFI (.843), RMSEA (.090), AIC (1123.38) were computed and compared with each 
other. The Δ² difference test revealed that both models did not differ significantly, Δ² (2, N = 
588) = 5.26, p = n.s.. Thus, the more parsimonious full mediation model was retained.  The 
partial mediation model comparing constructs of all three original models separately was 
compared with the model in that automatic thoughts fully mediate the association of brooding 
and reflection with depressive symptoms. The difference between the AICs (3.75) showed only 
weak support for equivalency. Thus, the model with automatic thoughts fully mediating the 
association of brooding and reflection with depressive symptoms was retained. 
Next, models in which brooding and reflection fully mediate the associations of the three 
negative scales of the CTI with automatic thoughts, ² (169, N = 588) = 1297.23, p < .001, χ2/df 
= 7.68, CFI (.775), RMSEA (.107), AIC (1463.23), and partially, ² (163, N = 588) = 910.22, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 5.58, CFI (.851), RMSEA (.088), AIC (1088.22) were computed. The Δ² 
difference test revealed that the partial mediation model fits the data significantly better than the 
model with full mediation, Δ² (6, N = 588) = 387.01, p < .001.  Thus, the model with brooding 
and reflection partially mediating the associations of the three negative CTI scales with 
automatic thoughts was compared with the model in that brooding and reflection effect 
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automatic thoughts but do not mediate these association between CTI scales and automatic 
thoughts, Δ² (6, N = 588) = 48.42, p < .001. Therefore, the model with brooding and reflection 
partially mediating the associations of the three negative CTI scales with automatic thoughts was 
retained. 
Based on Lo et al. (2008), models in which brooding and reflection fully, ² (162, N = 
588) = 868.74, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.36, CFI (.859), RMSEA (.086), AIC (1048.74), and partially, 
² (161, N = 588) = 868.15, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.39, CFI (.859), RMSEA (.087), AIC (1050.15), 
mediate the associations between inference style and depressive symptoms were calculated and 
compared, Δ² (1, N = 588) = 0.58, p = n.s.. Because both models did not differ significantly, the 
more parsimonious model with full mediation was retained. The mediation model with brooding 
and reflection fully mediating the association between inference style and depressive symptoms 
was compared with the model in that the response styles do not mediate this association using the 
AICs. The difference between AICs (48.49) showed essentially no support for equivalency. 
Thus, the full mediation model was retained. 
Based on Metalsky and Joiner (1992) and Spangler et al. (1997), models in which all 
three negative CTI scales fully, ² (162, N = 588) = 902.13, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.57, CFI (.852), 
RMSEA (.088), AIC (1082.13), and partially, ² (160, N = 588) = 852.44, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.33, 
CFI (.862), RMSEA (.086), AIC (1036.44) mediate the associations between inference style and 
all more proximal were computed. The Δ² difference test revealed that the partial mediation 
model fits the data significantly better than the model with full mediation, Δ² (2, N = 588) = 
49.69, p < .001. Further, the comparison between the model in which all three negative CTI 
scales partially mediate the associations between inference style and all more proximal 
constructs and the model in that only the negative view of future scale of the CTI partially 
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mediates these associations revealed that the latter model fits the data better, Δ² (2, N = 588) = 
16.30, p < .001, and therefore was retained. 
Next, the relations of inference style with dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive errors 
were studied. Thus, a model in which inference style fully mediates the associations between 
dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive errors with all other constructs in the model, ² (168, N = 
588) = 942.04, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.61, CFI (.845), RMSEA (.089), AIC (1110.04), a model in that 
inference style fully mediates the associations between dysfunctional attitudes but not cognitive 
errors with all other constructs in the model, ² (169, N = 588) = 1051.88, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.22, 
CFI (.824), RMSEA (.094), AIC (1217.88), and a model in dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive 
errors fully mediate the associations between inference style with all other constructs in the 
model, ² (163, N = 588) = 829.01, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.09, CFI (.867), RMSEA (.083), AIC 
(1007.01), were calculated. Comparisons of the AICs of all mediation models showed essentially 
no support for equivalency between any of these models. Thus, the model in which dysfunctional 
attitudes and cognitive errors fully mediate the associations between inference style with all 
other constructs in the model which had the lowest AIC was retained. Because of the cross-
sectional nature of the data, it was not possible to calculate similar models to test for partial 
mediation. Instead, a model in that inference style, dysfunctional attitudes, and cognitive errors 
correlate with each other was tested, ² (158, N = 588) = 747.44, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.73, CFI 
(.882), RMSEA (.080), AIC (935.44). A comparison of this model with the model in which 
dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive errors fully mediate the associations between inference 
style with all other constructs in the model demonstrated that the first model fit the data better 
than the full mediation model, Δ² (5, N = 588) = 81.57, p < .001. 
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While this model fit the data better than any other tested model, the RMSEA was only 
acceptable and the CFI was not acceptable. Therefore, associations that are not meaningful were 
identified using a cutoff of p = .20 (Burkholder & Harlow, 2003; Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1989). 
The inspection of the model revealed that the associations of automatic thoughts and reflection 
and the  CTI scale negative view of world with brooding and reflection were not meaningful. 
The step-wise elimination of the association of automatic thoughts with reflection, ² (159, N = 
588) = 748.08, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.71, CFI (.882), RMSEA (.079), AIC (934.08), and CTI scale 
negative view of world with brooding and reflection, ² (161, N = 588) = 749.05, p < .001, χ2/df 
= 4.65, CFI (.883), RMSEA (.079), AIC (931.05), lead to models that where all not significantly 
different from the previously described model but more parsimonious (without association of 
automatic thoughts with reflection, Δ² (1, N = 588) = 0.64, p = n.s.; CTI scale negative view of 
world with brooding and reflection, Δ² (3, N = 588) = 0.97, = n.s.). Therefore, while the 
goodness-of-fit and parsimony indices of the model without association between automatic 
thoughts and reflection, the CTI scale negative view of world and brooding and reflection, and 
inference and brooding did not fit the data better, this model was retained as final model of Study 
1. The standardized parameter estimates of the final model are presented in Figure 1. 
Discussion 
Study 1 was designed to provide first evidence for a proposed integrated cognitive model. 
Thus, Study 1 has three main purposes; first, it was designed to evaluate whether the cognitive 
constructs of the different models are distinct from each other (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 
1976; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Based on the majority of empirical studies, we 
hypothesize that all discussed cognitive constructs in the three cognitive models are 
distinguishable from each other and from depressive symptoms. The results of Study 1 provided 
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support for this hypothesis.The second purpose of Study 1 was to test whether and how the 
cognitive constructs of the three different models (Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) can be integrated in one cognitive model. In addition, it was a 
purpose of Study 1 to evaluate whether the effects of constructs from different cognitive models 
are mediated fully or partially. While the final model of Study 1 supported the idea of an 
integrated model in general, not all hypotheses were confirmed. Thus, while all negative views 
of the self, world, and future are associated with the inference style as proposed, a negative view 
of the world was not associated with either response styles. In addition and as predicted, 
brooding is associated with inference style and automatic thoughts. However, contrary to the 
expectation reflection was associated with inference style as well. Similar, contrary to the 
predictions, the associations of inference style, brooding, and reflection with depressive 
symptoms are statistically fully mediated. 
In addition, the analyses in Study 1 revealed that the scales of the CTI do not load on a 
common latent variable and that the positive CTI scales should not be included in the model. 
While the independence of the CTI scales could have been expected based on previous results 
about the factor structure of the CTI (Anderson & Skidmore, 1995; McIntosh & Fischer, 2000; 
Pössel, 2009b), it is somewhat unexpected that the elimination of the positive CTI scales 
improved the model fit. Thus, in Study 2 models with and without positive CTI scales will be 
compared. 
Furthermore, because the final model of Study 1 in general and the elimination of the 
associations of automatic thoughts with reflection and CTI scale negative view of world with 
brooding and reflection in particular were solely empirically driven, it can be argued that the 
results of Study 1 may depend heavily on the sample characteristics. Therefore, different models 
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with and without these associations will be compared in Study 2 and the final model of Study 1 




Participants and Procedures 
The sample for Study 2 was derived from 606 psychology students (450 females, 156 
males) at a university in the Southwest of Germany. Their age ranged from 18 to 49 years with a 
mean of 24.13 years and a standard deviation of 5.97 years. Of the participating students, 114 
(18.8%) reported clinically significant depressive symptoms in a self-report measure. During the 
spring semester, participants completed a questionnaires battery online that included a depression 
questionnaire and various instruments to measure cognitive constructs. The order of the 
questionnaires was counterbalanced across the sample following the Latin Square design. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and all participants were included in three 
prize drawings of 100 EURO for their participation in this study. 
Measures 
The measures used in Study 2 are identical to those used in Study 1 (see above). 
Data Analysis 
The statistical procedures utilized in Study 2 are identical to those used in Study 1 (see 
above). 
Results 
Descriptive data, internal consistency, and correlations for all instruments used in Study 2 
are presented in Table II. Almost all measures were moderately correlated with each other. As 
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expected, the RSQ scale reflection was the only exception and did not correlate with many of the 
other instruments to measure cognitive constructs. 
Test of Empirically Gained Improvements 
The final model of Study 1, ² (162, N = 606) = 714.45, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.41, CFI 
(.891), RMSEA (.075), AIC (894.45) was fit to the data of Study 2, resulting in similar values of 
the goodness-of-fit and parsimony indices as in Study 1. Thus, this model was compared to the 
same model including the positive CTI scales, ² (196, N = 606) = 825.30, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.21, 
CFI (.894), RMSEA (.073), AIC (1081.30). Replicating the result from Study 1, the former 
model fits the data better than the model including positive CTI scales, Δ² (34, N = 606) = 
110.85, p < .001. 
Next, the final model of Study 1 was compared to a model with associations of the CTI 
scale negative view of the world with both response styles, ² (160, N = 606) = 711.41, p < .001, 
χ2/df = 4.45, CFI (.891), RMSEA (.075), AIC (895.41), and a model with associations of the CTI 
scale negative view of the world with brooding and reflection and automatic thoughts with 
reflection, ² (159, N = 606) = 710.29, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.47, CFI (.841), RMSEA (.076), AIC 
(896.29). Again replicating Study 1, both comparisons revealed that the final model of Study 1 
did not differ significantly from the model with associations of the CTI scale negative view of 
the world with both response styles, Δ² (2, N = 606) = 1.12, p = n.s., or the model with 
associations of the CTI scale negative view of the world with brooding and reflection and 
automatic thoughts with reflection, Δ² (3, N = 606) = 4.15, p = n.s.. Thus, the final model of 
Study 1 as the more parsimonious model was retained. 
Comparisons to Theory-Driven Models 
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To replicate the results of Study 1, the same repeated sequence of analytical steps as in 
Study 1 was used but with the final model of Study 1 as starting point. Thus, a model separating 
the cognitive constructs of the three original cognitive models without positive CTI scales and 
allowing only for full mediation, ² (180, N = 606) = 1317.59, p < .001, χ2/df = 7.32, CFI (.775), 
RMSEA (.102), AIC (1461.59), was compared with a similar model but allowing for partial 
mediation, ² (170, N = 606) = 824.06, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.85, CFI (.870), RMSEA (.080), AIC 
(988.06). The Δ² difference test revealed that the partial mediation model fits the data 
significantly better than the model with full mediation, Δ² (10, N = 606) = 493.53, p < .001. 
Finally, comparing the AICs of the partial mediation model with the final model of Study 1 
found essentially no support for equivalency (difference between AICs: 93.61), replicating Study 
1. 
After this, models in which automatic thoughts mediate the association of brooding with 
depressive symptoms fully, ² (171, N = 606) = 814.62, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.76, CFI (.872), 
RMSEA (.079), AIC (976.62), and partially, ² (169, N = 606) = 812.47, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.81, 
CFI (.873), RMSEA (.079), AIC (978.47) were computed and compared with each other. The 
Δ² difference test revealed that the partial mediation model fits the data significantly better than 
the full mediation model, Δ² (2, N = 606) = 2.14, p = n.s.. Thus, the more parsimonious full 
mediation model was compared with the final model of Study 1. The difference between both 
AICs (82.17) showed essentially no support for equivalency. Therefore, the final model of Study 
1 was retained. 
Models in which brooding and reflection mediate the associations of the CTI scales 
negative view of the self and the future with automatic thoughts fully, ² (171, N = 606) = 
1099.93, p < .001, χ2/df = 6.43, CFI (.816), RMSEA (.095), AIC (1261.93), and partially, ² 
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(167, N = 606) = 794.59, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.75, CFI (.876), RMSEA (.079), AIC (964.59) were 
computed. The Δ² difference test revealed that the partial mediation model fits the data 
significantly better than the model with full mediation, Δ² (4, N = 606) = 305.33, p < .001.  
Thus, the model in which brooding and reflection partially mediate the associations of the CTI 
scales negative view of the self and the future with automatic thoughts was compared with the 
final model of Study 1. The difference in AICs (70.15) revealed essentially no support for 
equivalency in favor of the final model of Study 1. 
Next, models in which brooding and reflection fully, ² (166, N = 606) = 762.88, p < 
.001, χ2/df = 4.60, CFI (.882), RMSEA (.077), AIC (934.88), and partially, ² (165, N = 606) = 
761.41, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.61, CFI (.882), RMSEA (.077), AIC (935.41), mediate the 
associations between inference style and depressive symptoms were calculated and compared, 
Δ² (1, N = 606) = 1.47, p = n.s.. Because both models did not differ significantly, the more 
parsimonious model with full mediation was retained and compared to the final model of Study 
1, Δ² (4, N = 606) = 48.43, p < .001. Thus, the final model of Study 1 was retained. 
Following, models in which all three negative CTI scales fully, ² (166, N = 606) = 
779.95, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.70, CFI (.878), RMSEA (.078), AIC (951.95), and partially, ² (164, 
N = 606) = 751.78, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.58, CFI (.884), RMSEA (.077), AIC (927.78) mediate the 
associations between inference style and all more proximal were computed. The Δ² difference 
test revealed that the partial mediation model fits the data significantly better than the model with 
full mediation, Δ² (2, N = 606) = 28.18, p < .001. Further, the comparison between the model in 
which all three negative CTI scales partially mediate the associations between inference style 
and all more proximal and the final model of Study 1 revealed that the latter model fits the data 
significantly better, Δ² (2, N = 606) = 37.33, p < .001, and therefore it was retained. 
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Finally, a model in which inference style fully mediates the associations between 
dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive errors with all other constructs in the model, ² (172, N = 
606) = 929.10, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.40, CFI (.850), RMSEA (.085), AIC (1089.10), a model in that 
inference style fully mediates the associations between dysfunctional attitudes but not cognitive 
errors with all other constructs in the model, ² (173, N = 606) = 1019.20, p < .001, χ2/df = 5.89, 
CFI (.832), RMSEA (.090), AIC (1177.20), and a model in which dysfunctional attitudes and 
cognitive errors fully mediate the associations between inference style with all other constructs 
in the model, ² (167, N = 606) = 777.90, p < .001, χ2/df = 4.66, CFI (.879), RMSEA (.078), AIC 
(947.90), were calculated. Comparing the AICs of these not nested mediation models showed 
essentially no support for equivalency between any of these models. The model in which 
dysfunctional attitudes and cognitive errors fully mediate the associations between inference 
style with all other constructs in the model had the lowest AIC and was retained. Comparing this 
model with the final model of Study 1 revealed that the final model of Study 1 fit the data better 
than this model as well, Δ² (5, N = 606) = 63.45, p < .001.  Thus, the results of Study 1 were 
completely replicated in Study 2 using an independent sample. Thus, the standardized parameter 
estimates of the final model are presented in Figure 2. Nevertheless, as in Study 1, while this 
model fit the data better than any other tested model, the RMSEA was only acceptable and the 
CFI was not acceptable. 
General Discussion 
Three major cognitive theories to explain the development and maintenance of 
depression have been developed, empirically tested, and gained widespread popularity: Beck’s 
cognitive theory (Beck, 1976), the hopelessness model (Abramson, Alloy, & Metalsky, 1989), 
and the response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, Girus, & Seligman, 1992). All three models 
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have significant similarities. Negative view of the future as part of Beck’s cognitive model and 
hopelessness from the hopelessness model, for example, are strikingly similar (i.e., negative 
view of future and hopelessness). In addition, multiple empirical results revealed that the effects 
of cognitive constructs from one model are (statistically or temporally) mediated by constructs 
from another model (Metalsky & Joiner, 1992; Spasojević & Alloy, 2001). Thus, is seems 
logical to raise the questions whether cognitive constructs of all three theories can be integrated 
in one cognitive model. In order to develop such an integrated cognitive model, the first purpose 
of our studies was to investigate empirically if the cognitive constructs of the different models 
are distinct from each other. The second purpose of our studies was to test whether and how the 
cognitive constructs of all different models can be integrated into one comprising model. 
Concerning the first purpose of the studies, inference style is distinguishable from 
depressogenic schemata and cognitive errors as described in Beck’s (1976) cognitive model and 
both response styles are distinguishable from automatic thoughts. These results are consistent 
with our predictions and the majority of previous empirical studies (Alloy et al., 1999; Haeffel et 
al., 2003; Hankin et al., 2007; Joiner & Rudd, 1996; Spangler et al., 1997). 
To test whether and how the cognitive constructs of the three different models 
(Abramson et al., 1989; Beck, 1976; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) can be integrated in one 
cognitive model, the second purpose of the studies, different alternatives to integrate the 
cognitive constructs of the different models were tested in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2. 
Consistent with theoretical considerations (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004; Smith & Alloy, 2009), 
previous empirical results (Spasojević & Alloy, 2001), and our hypotheses, the results of both 
studies confirmed that brooding but not reflection influences depressive symptoms, statistically 
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fulyl mediated by automatic thoughts. Further, both response styles are effected by a negative 
view of the self and the future but not of the world. 
In addition, as proposed by Metalsky and Joiner (1992) and Spangler et al. (1997), all 
three negative parts of the cognitive triad are associated with inference style. In addition, 
consistent with Lo et al.’s (2008) and Spasojević and Alloy’s (2001) findings, response style is 
associated with inference style and serves further as full statistical mediator in the association 
between inference style and depressive symptoms. 
The fact that brooding but not reflection is associated with automatic thoughts is 
consistent with previous studies that found not association of reflection with depressive 
symptoms and other cognitive constructs (Lo et al., 2008; Treynor et al., 2003). Beyond that, a 
recent longitudinal study testing the associations between Beck’s constructs (1976) measured as 
one latent variable and the two ruminative response styles brooding and reflection (Pössel, 
2010b) found that that Beck’s constructs influence brooding while the elimination of reflection 
increased the model fit. This raises the question what might have contributed to retaining 
reflection in the presented studies but not in the former study. First, the former study was a 
longitudinal study while the presented studies are cross-sectional. However, up to now, there is 
no support for reflection being concurrently but not predictively associated with depressive 
symptoms and other cognitive constructs (Treynor et al., 2003). Second, in the former study the 
constructs of Beck’s cognitive theory were conceptualized as one latent variable while the same 
constructs were included as distinguishable in the presented studies. In addition, two of four 
tested associations of reflection with constructs of Beck’s theory proved to be significant. Third, 
the presented studies included inference style which is significantly associated with reflection as 
well. Thus, it seems that the more fine-grained test of associations between reflection and 
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constructs of Beck’s model and the inclusion of the hopelessness model (Abramson et al., 1989) 
allowed to add reflection into the integrated cognitive model. That a negative view of the world 
is not associated with either of the two response styles in the presented studies might be caused 
by the fact that none of the RSQ items refers to anything outside of the individual answering the 
items. Thus, the lack of associations between negative view of the world and response style 
might be explained by the content of the RSQ items. To test this hypothesis, future research 
needs to generate additional items measuring the rumination about extra-personal reasons for the 
depressed mood of the individual. 
Finally, while not predicted it is consistent with previous findings that the positive and 
negative scales of the German CTI do not form a common factor (Pössel, 2009b). However, that 
the elimination of the positive CTI scales improved the model was unexpected as previous 
findings found significant correlations between positive CTI scales and depressive symptoms as 
well as other cognitive constructs (Pössel, 2009b). Nevertheless, it needs to be considered that 
the correlations of positive CTI scales with depressive symptoms and other cognitive constructs 
are lower than the same correlations of negative CTI scales (Pössel, 2009b), a pattern that holds 
up for other cognitive constructs like positive and negative automatic thoughts as well (Pössel, 
Seemann, & Hautzinger, 2005). Regardless, future research is necessary before the positive view 
of the self, the world, and the future should be considered unimportant for an integrated 
cognitive model. 
Limitations 
The presented findings need to be interpreted with certain limitations in mind. The cross-
sectional design of both studies is an important limitation because it does not allow any 
conclusions about temporal sequence. Thus, the sequential order reported here refers exclusively 
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to statistical but not temporal mediation effects and future studies with a longitudinal design are 
needed to test the temporal sequential order. 
The sole use of self-report instruments leads to some questions about the validity of the 
results. In particular, it is questionable how much insight individuals have into the process of 
their own thinking (e.g., cognitive errors, depressogenic schemata, response style) and it can be 
argued that this information is outside of our awareness (see Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005, for a 
review). Therefore, information processing paradigms might be better suited than self-report 
questionnaires when measuring process constructs. In addition, a mono-method bias of using the 
same informant and method for assessing all constructs in this study is likely. Thus, future 
studies would benefit from the use of multiple methods (e.g., self-report questionnaires, 
interview data to measure depressive symptoms, and information processing paradigms) to 
assess cognitive constructs and depression. Nevertheless, for many of the process constructs, 
information processing paradigms have not yet been developed (Gotlib & Neubauer, 2000), 
while self-report instruments are readily available for all measured constructs. Therefore, we 
decided to use these well-established instruments in our studies.  
In addition, not including stress as a factor for the integrating model could be interpreted 
as a limitation because all three cognitive models can be seen as vulnerability-stress theories. As 
our goal was to solely focus on the integration of cognitive variables at this time, however, we 
decided to not include stress into our analyses.  
Another limitation are the restrictions resulting from the utilisation of two university 
samples with the majority of participants being female. The homogeneity of both samples 
concerning sex, educational level, age range, and social environment may limit the 
generalizability of the results to general and clinical populations. The limitation to mainly 
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females participants is important to point out because of the sex difference in depression 
(Weissman et al., 1996) and of prior research demonstrating opposite patterns of responses on 
the DAS and CSQ for females and males (Haeffel et al., 2003). As we have not investigated 
clinical levels of depression with structured diagnostic interviews, it is unclear whether the 
findings can be generalized to more severe levels of depression. Nevertheless, most research 
suggests that depression can be seen best as dimensional (e.g., Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, & 
Waldman, 2005). Thus, it is likely that our results could be replicated in a clinical sample. In 
addition, using a community sample, our results should be less prone to Berkon’s bias and more 
generalizable when compared with a clinic-referred sample (Cohen & Cohen, 1984). 
Nonetheless, replication studies with different populations, including clinical samples, would be 
desirable. 
In summary, both studies replicate and extend earlier findings by providing evidence that 
core cognitive constructs of the three models of depression are distinct from each other while 
they can be integrated into one model. While the results of both studies found identical 
associations between the cognitive constructs of different model, our integrated cognitive model 
needs to be replicated in future studies that overcome limitations of the presented studies (i.e., 
cross-sectional design, sole use of self-report instruments, no measures of stress, sample 
restriction to university samples with mainly female participants). If our results can be 
confirmed, the integrated cognitive model might provide the theoretical framework to better 
understand how therapeutic techniques derived from one original model influence cognitive 
variables from another cognitive model. It might even allow for improvements with regard to the 
effectiveness of psychotherapies for depression by theory-driven combinations of therapeutic 
techniques that are based on different models. 
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Table I 
Descriptive Data and Correlations Between All Instruments Used in Study 1. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1.CES-D .89                  
2.DASp .42 .87                 
3.DASa .23 .53 .69                
4.CEQ -.35 -.53 -.39 .87               
5.CTInse -.54 -.60 -.31 .46 .81              
6.CTInwo -.48 -.45 -.21 .36 .56 .68             
7.CTInfu -.49 -.42 -.25 .34 .44 .31 .63            
8.CTIpse -.38 -.42 -.18 .29 .55 .26 .33 .77           
9.CTIpwo -.32 -.27 -.06 .19 .42 .34 .21 .38 .50          
10.CTIpfu -.33 -.32 -.08 .24 .33 .23 .43 .45 .47 .68         
11.ATQ .75 .49 .27 -.40 -.66 -.49 -.48 -.36 -.30 -.33 .89        
12.CSQie .11 .25 .16 -.21 -.26 -.11 -.10 -.28 .02 -.01 .13 .75       
13.CSQgs .32 .41 .30 -.38 -.39 -.28 -.30 -.23 -.17 -.09 .35 .29 .91      
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14.CSQsu .12 .18 .24 -.19 -.23 -.13 -.15 -.11 -.03 -.02 .18 .23 .44 .84     
15.CSQco .36 .48 .36 -.45 -.40 -.38 -.37 -.21 -.18 -.17 .37 .13 .68 .26 .91    
16.CSQse .35 .47 .34 -.47  -.44 -.37 -.30 -.32 -.20 .37 .17 .56 .22 .66 .92   
17.RSQb .28 .37 .31 -.38 -.12 -.03 .08 -.05 .02 .07 .36 .16 .24 .10 .24 .32 .59  
18.RSQr -.03 .06 .09 -.13 -.44 -.25 -.16 -.24 -.14 -.06 .04 .06 .11 .09 .10 .20 .39 .70 
Mean 35.05 23.99 31.48 99.90 34.24 25.99 26.77 22.15 27.36 23.35 20.50 46.63 37.65 44.92 29.60 26.61 2.48 2.30 
SD 9.15 11.58 8.12 11.31 5.56 4.76 3.40 3.47 3.75 3.82 8.01 7.89 10.80 12.04 11.34 11.83 0.61 0.75 
Note. N = 561 for all variables. Values in the diagonal represent Cronbach’s Alpha. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale; DASp = Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, performance evaluation; DASa = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, approval by others; CEQ = Cognitive Error Questionnaire total score; CTInse = Cognitive Triad 
Inventory, negative view of self; CTInwo = Cognitive Triad Inventory, negative view of world; CTInfu = Cognitive Triad Inventory, negative view of future; CTIpse = Cognitive 
Triad Inventory, positive view of self; CTIpwo = Cognitive Triad Inventory, positive view of world; CTIpfu = Cognitive Triad Inventory, positive view of future; ATQ = 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, negative self-statements; CSQie = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events intrinsic-extrinsic; CSQgs = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, 
negative events general-specific; CSQsu = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events stable/unstable; CSQco = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events consequences; 
CSQse = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events self; RSQb = Response styles Questionnaire, brooding; RSQr = Response styles Questionnaire, reflection. All correlations 
≥ .09 are significant at p < .05. 
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Table II 
Descriptive Data and Correlations Between All Instruments Used in Study 2. 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 
1.CES-D .92                  
2.DASp .39 .89                 
3.DASa .22 .50 .75                
4.CEQ -.32 -.62 -.36 .88               
5.CTInse -.54 -.63 -.28 .55 .84              
6.CTInwo -.47 -.47 -.16 .39 .60 .61             
7.CTInfu -.50 -.45 -.23 .36 .58 .51 .59            
8.CTIpse -.43 -.50 -.18 .43 .69 .34 .42 .80           
9.CTIpwo -.38 -.44 -.08 .34 .46 .47 .45 .43 .50          
10.CTIpfu -.44 -.39 -.14 .32 .52 .33 .54 .59 .49 .71         
11.ATQ .79 .48 .26 -.45 -.65 -.52 -.56 -.42 -.41 -.41 .90        
12.CSQie .18 .29 .20 -.32 -.37 -.13 -.13 -.36 -.12 -.19 .25 .73       
13.CSQgs .35 .39 .23 -.31 -.46 -.38 -.27 -.32 -.29 -.24 .43 .44 .83      
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14.CSQsu .18 .28 .17 -.29 -.30 -.23 -.16 -.25 -.23 -.21 .26 .47 .62 .85     
15.CSQco .33 .38 .21 -.32 -.43 -.39 -.29 -.29 -.29 -.22 .42 .36 .77 .52 .90    
16.CSQse .37 .53 .34 -.51 -.53 -.31 -.36 -.41 -.27 -.29 .49 .47 .61 .45 .62 .93   
17.RSQb .25 .28 .27 -.39 -.31 -.24 -.14 -.15 -.11 -.08 .37 .24 .21 .17 .19 .32 .59  
18.RSQr .18 .10 .09 -.09 -.08 -.17 -.04 .02 -.08 -.03 .22 .04 .16 .21 .16 .18 .38 .74 
Mean 36.37 27.55 33.70 96.40 33.10 24.74 25.63 21.88 26.62 26.82 23.44 46.02 36.54 42.27 32.47 30.26 2.46 2.52 
SD 10.74 13.39 8.57 13.09 6.46 4.59 4.02 3.83 3.97 4.23 9.05 8.36 9.95 10.23 11.41 13.57 0.73 0.66 
Note. N = 450 for all variables. Values in the diagonal represent Cronbach’s Alpha. CES-D = Center for Epidemiological Studies – Depression Scale; DASp = Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale, performance evaluation; DASa = Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, approval by others; CEQ = Cognitive Error Questionnaire total score; CTInse = Cognitive Triad 
Inventory, negative view of self; CTInwo = Cognitive Triad Inventory, negative view of world; CTInfu = Cognitive Triad Inventory, negative view of future; CTIpse = Cognitive 
Triad Inventory, positive view of self; CTIpwo = Cognitive Triad Inventory, positive view of world; CTIpfu = Cognitive Triad Inventory, positive view of future; ATQ = 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, negative self-statements; CSQie = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events intrinsic-extrinsic; CSQgs = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, 
negative events general-specific; CSQsu = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events stable/unstable; CSQco = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events consequences; 
CSQse = Cognitive Style Questionnaire, negative events self; RSQb = Response styles Questionnaire, brooding; RSQr = Response styles Questionnaire, reflection. All correlations 
≥ .09 are significant at p < .05. 
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Figure 1 
The final integrated cognitive model of depression in Study 1. 
 
Figure 2 
The final integrated cognitive model of depression in Study 2. 
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